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Higher or Basic Education? The Composition of
Human Capital and Economic Development
RODNEY RAMCHARAN*
No country has achieved sustained economic development without investment in
education. But do all types of human capital affect growth identically? And which
types of schooling—secondary or tertiary—should public policy promote? This
paper develops an analytical framework to address these questions. It shows how
the composition of human capital stock determines a country’s development. Hence,
promoting the “wrong” type of schooling can have little effect on development. In
addition, the paper helps in understanding why empirical studies have failed to find
a significant relationship between schooling and growth. [JEL O11, O41, I20]
N
o country has achieved sustained economic development without substantial
investment in human capital. Motivated in part by this observation, an ex-
tensive theoretical literature has evolved to analyze the channels through which
human capital can affect growth (surveys include Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995;
and Temple, 1999). Much of this literature has emphasized the complementary
relationship between human and physical capital, noting how imbalances in these
two stocks, as well as human capital externalities, can affect economic growth.
However, because human capital is typically treated as a homogeneous concept,
very little is understood about how different types of education—tertiary, second-
ary, and so forth—shape the overall development process.
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ful comments.Yet both the case study (World Bank, 1998) and the more formal economet-
ric evidence suggest that important complementarities do exist between various
types of human capital. And as the evidence from the Green Revolution1 in Asia
suggests, these apparent complementarities can greatly affect development. The
highly educated, such as scientists and technicians, appear to have a compara-
tive advantage in understanding and adapting new or existing ideas into produc-
tion processes. Meanwhile, some minimum level of education is required to follow
the production template and successfully execute the production steps (Nelson
and Phelps, 1966; Bartel and Lichtenberg, 1987; and Deolalikar and Evenson,
1994). Thus, do all types of human capital affect growth identically? Does the
impact of a particular type of human capital on growth depend on the presence
of other types of human capital? What are the characteristics of an optimal edu-
cation policy?
To address these questions, this paper develops a simple analytic framework
that emphasizes the role of the composition of the human capital stock. The frame-
work relies on two key assumptions. First, it assumes that each skill type performs
a specific but complementary function within the production process in the skilled
sector. Moreover, the ideas developed by the highly skilled are assumed to be non-
rival but excludable, creating demand linkages between the education types that
are external to the firm. And thus, the rate of return for either skill input depends
on the educational composition of the entire workforce.
Second, the paper studies these demand factors within the context of endog-
enous schooling costs. In many countries, the lack of access to schools and the
limited supply of teachers negatively affect the schooling investment decision
(Mookherjee and Ray, 2000). The argument assumes that previous enrollments—
the current stock of educated labor—engender improvements in the educational
infrastructure: more potential teachers, more schools, and more suitable curricula,
which in turn diminish the sunk cost associated with human capital investment and
outwardly shift the supply curve for skilled labor (Foster and Rosenzweig, 1996).
Using this framework, the paper argues that the confluence of demand and
supply forces creates a pattern of circularity between educational investment
across the various skill categories and demonstrates how the composition—not the
level—of the human capital stock determines the long-run steady-state level of
development. For instance, consider the case of an economy with a limited num-
ber of secondary-educated labor. The inability of the economy to adequately use
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1While advances in biotechnology, pioneered in the developed countries, made the development of the
high-yielding variety (HYV) seeds in such staples as rice and wheat possible, local scientists and agron-
omists were necessary to adapt these HYV seeds to the local climatic conditions. Once developed, the use
of these seed strains are nonrival but can be excluded. However, using HYV seeds requires a greater atten-
tion to fertilizer quantity, irrigation, and soil conditions. Thus, as indicated by Foster and Rosenzweig
(1996) in the case of India, educated farmers adopted the more technologically advanced seed strains more
rapidly than those without sufficient schooling. Furthermore, the authors found that the returns to educa-
tion increased in those areas where adoption had the highest potential gains. In addition, the expansion of
schooling and the many agricultural extension projects designed to facilitate adoption increased the rate of
return to research and development in seed technology through the market size effect, as well as through
the fact that the feedback from more educated farmers was more useful in developing better seed varieties.technology within the skilled sector because of the limited supply of secondary-
educated labor reduces the productivity of tertiary-educated workers and dampens
the overall incentives for education investment. Moreover, the low returns to edu-
cation may not justify the fixed cost required to invest in schooling, resulting in
little human capital accumulation. The model also illustrates that in this case, even
large investments in tertiary schooling will have little effect on long-run develop-
ment, as the extra tertiary-educated skilled labor may not sufficiently raise the
return to secondary education to create a self-sustaining investment cycle toward
a higher steady state.
The analysis is able to isolate two important characteristics of an optimal edu-
cation policy. First, education investment is ongoing over time along an optimal
path, but its rate of increase diminishes. Thus, the first generation experiences the
biggest increase in schooling investment. But each subsequent generation be-
comes better educated than its predecessor, with the difference in attainment across
generations declining with time. Naturally, the cost of education increases as the
enrollment level increases—the flow of investment. Also, because of diminishing
marginal productivity into the unskilled sector, the shadow cost of moving labor
in the skilled sector increases with attainment. Therefore, it is cost minimizing to
incur the largest flow of investment initially, when the shadow cost of secondary-
schooling investment is at its minimum. Second, the analysis argues that because
the social marginal product of labor in the skilled sector depends on the level of
the complementary input, the expansion in schooling should occur across both types
of schooling simultaneously.
The decentralized model also helps explain the failure of many empirical
studies to observe the expected strong correlation between economic growth and
human capital accumulation.2 Much of this research uses the average years of
schooling within the population as the sole measure of educational attainment.
This methodology implicitly treats each year of schooling as identical, assumes
that workers of each education category are perfect substitutes for workers of other
education categories, and assumes that the marginal productivity of an additional
year of schooling is the same given every level of schooling attainment (Mulligan
and Sala-i-Martin, 1995). But as the model indicates, the average years of school-
ing can mask fundamental differences in the composition of the human capital
stock; examples in the paper show that countries with identical average years of
schooling can converge to very different development steady states. The model
used to develop these arguments is related to the literature on costly investment
across multiple sectors (Matsuyama, 1991; Krugman, 1991; and Carrington,
Detragiache, and Vishwanath, 1996), as well as to literature that explores the rela-
tionship between human capital and development: Lucas (1988), Azariadis and
Drazen (1990), and Romer (1990).
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2Islam (1995), Benhabib and Spiegel (1994), Dasgupta and Weale (1992), Pritchett (1996), Barro and
Sala-i-Martin (1995), and Lau, Jamison, and Louat (1991) all find an insignificant or negative correlation
between various measures of educational attainment and economic growth. Recently Krueger and Lindahl
(1998) have questioned the accuracy of these results. They argue that measurement error in the education
data negatively biases the human capital coefficient.I. Model
External Demand Linkages
There are three labor categories: unskilled or unschooled (U), low skilled (L)—
those with only basic education such as secondary schooling—and the high
skilled (H) or tertiary educated. The terminology tertiary and secondary is used
solely to organize the discussion; these linkages can potentially exist across var-
ious types of human capital. The economy produces a single consumption good.
Production of this good occurs both in the unskilled sector, where only unskilled
labor is used, and in the skilled sector, where both low-skilled workers and tertiary-
educated managers are complementary inputs. I assume that some of the ideas
developed by the high-skilled agents spill over across firm boundaries and im-
prove the productivity of all secondary-educated workers within the skilled sec-
tor (Romer, 1990). This externality ensures that low-skilled labor productivity is
in part a function of the total employment of high-skilled labor. Furthermore,
some of the ideas generated by the tertiary-educated labor within a firm become
proprietary and are licensed for use by other firms within the sector. Thus, the
reward to tertiary investment depends on the number of low-skilled workers—this
is the market size effect (Acemoglu, 1998). Using a standard Cobb-Douglas
framework, I describe the production structure of a representative firm in the
skilled sector:
(1)
The functions g(H) and f(L) denote the external effects of aggregate high- and
low-skilled labor at the firm level, respectively. To simplify the analysis further, let
g(H) = H and f(L) = L. Production at the firm level occurs using a constant returns
to scale technology, but the external demand linkages between secondary- and ter-
tiary-educated labor generate increasing returns to scale at the sector level
(Matsuyama, 1991). Output in the unskilled sector relies solely on unskilled labor
and uses a standard Cobb-Douglas technology subject to diminishing marginal
productivity. All factor prices are determined by the marginal productivity of the
factor. The wages of the unskilled, low skilled, and high skilled are given respec-
tively by
(2)
where B > 0. I also assume that the population is constant and without loss of gen-
erality normalized to a constant p:
(3)
To better understand the nature of the transition from unskilled to skilled in the
production process and the role of sunk costs, assume that education investment is
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312irreversible.3 The investment process is sequential, and agents incur a unique fixed
cost at each step in the educational ladder. The size of this sunk cost depends on an
agent’s personal characteristics, such as preferences, family background, and intrin-
sic ability, as well as policy variables, such as the development of the education
infrastructure: distance from home to school, the quality of instruction, and the
nature of the curriculum. I assume that these factors are uncorrelated with future
productivity. These characteristics are summarized by a cost index θ∈Θand q(θ)
denotes the fraction of the population of type less than or equal to θ; this function is
strictly increasing, continuous, and differentiable. Let cH (H(t), θ) denote the private
cost of tertiary schooling for an agent of type θ,g iven the stock of tertiary educated
workers H(t) at time t. In keeping with the idea that the size of the sunk cost dimin-
ishes with the stock of educated agents, I assume that c
H
1 ( ,  ) < 0 while c
H
2 ( ,  ) > 0.
The private cost of secondary schooling, cL(H(t) + L(t), θ), is similarly defined, and
for any θ it naturally follows that cL(H(t) + L(t), θ) < cH (H(t), θ). For simplicity, I
also assume that agents are endowed with perfect foresight and investment in edu-
cation is irreversible. Individuals maximize the present discounted value of their
income stream by choosing the optimal dates on which to invest in education.4
Investment Decision
Define VH (L(τ2)) to be the value of tertiary education at some date τ2. Since edu-
cational investment is irreversible, the value of tertiary education is the present dis-
counted value of its income stream from date τ2 onward:
(4)
where r > 0 is the constant and exogenously given discount rate, and the high-
skilled wage at time t is WH (t) = A(1 −α ) L(t). Let VL(H(τ1), L(τ1) θ) denote the
value of secondary education for an agent of type θ at a date τ1 < τ2. A secondary-
educated agent must choose the optimal date on which to incur the sunk cost and
invest in tertiary education. This problem can be written as
(5)
where the low-skilled wage at time t is wL(H(t)) = AαH(t). The structure of the
investment problem facing an unskilled agent is similar to the one described above.
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3This is only a simplifying assumption; in equilibrium, the skill premia are always positive (Lemma 1
in the Appendix)
4One interpretation of the idea that individuals are infinitely lived and wait until the optimal date to
invest in education is that generations or families pass on their existing level of education to their children.
Given the cost of schooling and the demand for (skilled) labor in the current period, these children then
decide whether to invest in schooling and add to their family’s capital stock or delay and pass on only the
existing level to future generations. In this way, if the educational infrastructure rapidly expands, then fam-
ilies and, by extension, society quickly become educated; otherwise it takes a longer time. See Galor and
Tsiddon (1997) for an overlapping generations model with some of these characteristics.For some date τ0,w here τ0 < τ1 < τ2, let VU(H(τ0), U(τ0), L(τ0) θ) denote the value
of the unskilled state for an individual of type θ. An unskilled individual then
selects the optimal date on which to invest in secondary schooling:
(6)
Using the condition L = p − H − U, let γH (H(t), U(t)) denote the premium induced
by tertiary education relative to secondary schooling in period t. Similarly, γL(H(t),
U(t)) represents the premium to secondary education relative to the unskilled state.
Lemma A.1 in the Appendix shows that these respective skill premia are always
positive; the irreversibility assumption used in simplifying the Bellman equations
does not impose any dynamic inconsistency within the model. As a result, the fol-
lowing result can easily be derived.
Result 1: The behavior of educational attainment along a perfect foresight equi-
librium path is described by
(7)
(8)
There is no investment in tertiary education if
(9)
There is no investment in secondary education if
(10)
Equations (7) and (8) define a planar dynamical system in (H, U) space that
describes the aggregate behavior of educational attainment. Investment in educa-
tion is ongoing only if its rate of return is positive. The size of the externality, c1( ),
determines the sensitivity of aggregate behavior toward the capital gains rate. And
unless the externality is zero, convergence toward the equilibrium stock of educa-
tion is gradual, implying that educational attainment occurs slowly over time.
Some agents find it optimal to wait for the cost of schooling to diminish rather
than invest in education given the current incentives. And the bigger the reduction
in schooling costs over time, the more attractive waiting becomes. A stationary
state occurs when the present discounted value of the skill premium is less than or
equal to the cost of schooling. It should be reiterated that whenever the cost of
schooling exceeds the skill premium there is no new investment in schooling. But
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314this does not imply that those already educated wish to reverse their educational
decision; skill premia are always positive along an equilibrium path.
Equilibrium and Dynamics
Building on the idea of threshold externalities (Azariadis and Drazen, 1990), this
subsection uses a phase diagram approach to characterize the equilibrium behav-
ior described in Result 1. In particular, I consider a nonlinear schooling external-
ity, one that captures the idea that over some range of attainment the educational
infrastructure may be slow to develop but then improves at a more rapid pace be-
yond some level of attainment. Figure 1 qualitatively depicts this idea, where the
slope of the cost function indicates the size of the externality. This cost structure
can produce multiple stable steady states, so that the composition of the human
capital stock determines both the pattern of educational attainment and the long-
run steady-state level of educational attainment.
The level curves corresponding to equations (7) and (8), µ = M−1(0), v = N−1(0),
are depicted in Figure 2. I assume that µ and v intersect at three locations. Hence,
the “threshold” nature of the externality produces multiple stable steady states. In
an economy with a small stock of educational attainment, the large and slowly
declining schooling costs are unable to offset the initially weak demand for skilled
labor. Therefore, the economy converges to a low steady-state level of attainment.
As drawn, vertices A and C are the only asymptotically stable equilibria.5
COMPOSITION OF HUMAN CAPITAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
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Figure 1. Nonlinear Externality
c(H)
H 
5This is shown formally in the Appendix, Result A.2.The composition of the human capital stock determines not only the dynamic
pattern of educational investment, but also the steady-state level of educational
attainment. In Figure 2, production is predominantly undertaken in the skilled sec-
tor at point A. The equilibrium defined by point C characterizes a backward econ-
omy with a largely uneducated workforce. To illustrate the pattern of education
attainment, consider the set defined by region 4. In this region the rate of return to
both types of schooling are negative: RH(H, U) < 0, RU(H, U) > 0 and there is no
investment in schooling. Although educational attainment maybe initially ongo-
ing, trajectories that enter region 4 never leave, and educational investment ceases.
Consider an initial point d in region 6. Investment in secondary schooling is ongoing
U ˙ < 0, while the rate of return to tertiary schooling is negative but increasing as 
the size of the low-skilled labor force grows: When the trajectory reaches
the boundary of region 4, the rate of return to tertiary schooling is still negative. But
rising marginal productivity in the unskilled sector means that the rate of return to
secondary schooling is now zero, and educational investment ceases. Economies
with endowments in the interior of region 4 never experience economic growth.
In contrast, economies with initial conditions located in regions 1, 2, and 3










Figure 2. Decentralized Dynamics
(Nonlinear externality)
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νpoint e in region 2. In both economies d and e, the rate of return to tertiary-educated
labor is negative, and only secondary investment is ongoing. However, since 
He > Hd, then  RU(He, Ue)  >  RU(Hd, Ud) ,w hich leads to greater investment in
secondary education in economy e. Because of the external demand linkages, the
growing secondary-educated labor force coupled with the lower initial cost of ter-
tiary schooling spark investment in tertiary schooling in economy e. This occurs
when the trajectory crosses the level curve u. Therefore, while economy d con-
verges to a steady state on the boundary of region 4, with no increase in its initial
stock of tertiary-educated labor, economy e converges to the high attainment steady
state A.
These ideas imply that the average years of schooling can be unrelated to
growth. Consider the lines labeled X,Y, and Z in Figure 3. These are iso-average
lines, where the stocks of H and U vary so that the average years of schooling is
held constant. That is, if the years of schooling required for performing high-
skilled, low-skilled, and unskilled tasks are nH, nL, nU,w here nH > nL > nU, then
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Y ZThe composition of the human capital stock can vary dramatically along an
iso-average line. For example, an increase in the number of unskilled workers re-
duces the total years of schooling in the population. In order to offset this decline
and hold the average years constant, there must be a rise in the number of high-
skilled workers, where the magnitude of this change depends on the number of
years of schooling required for each type of education.
In Figure 3, I draw three such iso-average lines: X,Y, and Z, where n ¯x > n ¯y > n ¯z.
All endowments located along the X iso-average line converge to the high steady
state, while all endowments along the Z iso-average line converge to the low
steady state. In the former case, the average years of schooling imply a skilled sec-
tor large enough to be self-sustaining. In the latter case, the skilled sector is too
small to produce a dramatic shift in the production process, and the economy con-
verges to a low steady state. But because average years of schooling can mask
fundamental differences in the composition of the human capital stock, sharp dif-
ferences in development can still be observed even along an iso-average line. For
example, consider the endowments d, e, and f located on the iso-average line Y.
Although the average years of schooling remain constant, as we move from point
d to point f, the size of the skilled sector shrinks and so do the private incentives
for educational investment. As a result, while economy d converges to the high
steady state, f approaches the low steady state.
Policy Implications
The previous section demonstrated how large and slowly decreasing private edu-
cation costs coupled with demand linkages can lead to multiple equilibria. Within
this context, unless government policy is carefully chosen, it may ultimately have
little or no impact on the economy’s long-run steady state. To be more precise,
consider the case of a social planner who chooses the level of tertiary and second-
ary enrollments to maximize the present discounted value of output net of educa-
tion costs:
subject to
where the government internalizes the demand linkages:
(12)
and the total cost of tertiary schooling is given by
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318The first argument in the cost function reflects the idea that the existing level
of tertiary attainment lowers the private cost of tertiary investment. However, a rise
in the level of schooling enrollments requires increased expenditures on in-
frastructure and other education inputs. Thus, I assume that at any instant the total
cost of tertiary schooling is an increasing and convex function of the flow of cur-
rent investment in tertiary schooling: the enrollment level. The cost of secondary
schooling is similarly defined:
(14)
By making the simplifying assumptions that the marginal impact of attainment on
the private cost of schooling is independent of the current enrollment levels, and
that the marginal impact of attainment decreases in the level of attainment, the
first-order conditions for an optimal policy are both necessary and sufficient. Along
an optimal path, the social planner chooses the level of tertiary investment such
that the cost difference of endowing the marginal agent with tertiary education at
time t rather than at t +∆ t is just offset by the net social marginal product contri-
buted by that agent over the interval [t, t +∆ t]:
(15)
The intuition for secondary investment is similar.
From the first-order conditions (Appendix, Result A.3) along an optimal path
the change in the flow of human capital investment diminishes over time. There-
fore, while attainment increases over time, the initial change in the level of enroll-
ment in both secondary and tertiary education should be the greatest. That is, along
an optimal path the first generations experience the biggest increase in schooling
investment. The simultaneous expansion of both kinds of schooling follows from
the fact that the social marginal product of labor in the skilled sector depends on the
level of the complementary input. Thus, by investing in both types of education,
the social planner increases the social marginal product of each unit of labor in the
skilled sector.
A combination of two factors leads to the result that the change in enroll-
ment levels should diminish over time. First, an optimal education policy post-
pones investment in secondary education for the marginal agent from the current
to a later date if the net present value of the marginal agent’s contribution in the
current instant is less than the difference in the marginal costs over the interval.
Because the marginal cost of investment in secondary schooling increases in the
flow of investment, at each instant policymakers face an upward-sloping supply
curve for new skilled labor. Second, over time diminishing marginal productiv-
ity in the unskilled sector reduces the net marginal benefit of adding to the secondary
skilled capital stock and expanding the skilled sector. Therefore, along an opti-
mal path, the net marginal benefit of skilled labor is at its greatest initially. Hence,
it is optimal for the policymaker to increase enrollments over time, with the biggest
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319increases occurring early in the development process. Smaller increases occur later
as the shadow cost of skilled labor—the marginal product of unskilled labor—
grows, making it profitable to slow the rate of educational investment. In con-
trast, if the cost of educating the marginal agent was constant (a flat supply
curve), then there would be no incentive to postpone investments to lower current
marginal costs, and the social planner solves a simple static problem. Note that
since the social planner internalizes the demand linkages, as well as the private
cost of schooling, the steady-state level of attainment exceeds the decentralized
equilibrium.
II. Conclusion
This paper has argued that the composition of the educational stock plays an
important role in shaping the incentives for investment in education. And unless
carefully chosen, education policy can prove wasteful, leaving the potential long-
run development steady state unchanged. To avoid this outcome, the paper argues
that the initial investments in both types of schooling should be the heaviest, and
that investments should occur in both education types. The model is helpful in
interpreting the empirical literature. The many empirical studies that have failed to
detect a positive correlation between the growth in average years of schooling and
economic growth is unsurprising. The average years of schooling can mask poten-
tially important differences in the composition. Examples in the text highlight this
empirical difficulty.
However, the argument is quite sensitive to both the posited relationship be-
tween the two types of schooling and to the modeling of schooling costs. In the
case of the former, the complementarity between high- and low-skilled workers
may be quite weak as openness to trade and the flow of ideas from abroad may be
more critical factors in the determination of educational investment and technical
change. Hence, it may well be that developing economies need only invest in
secondary schooling, importing high-skilled education embodied in the foreign
goods. Separately, the analysis has mechanically modeled schooling costs. But the
nature of the cost itself may have implications for the argument. For example, the
literature (Benabou, 1993; Bond,Wang, and Yip, 1996; and Hanushek, Leung, and
Yilmaz, 2001, 2002) explores different mechanisms through which schooling
costs influenced the incentives for schooling investment. The related issue of credit
constraints and its impact on education investment has also been subsumed into the
paper’s general treatment of schooling costs.
There is still an active empirical debate over the role of schooling in growth,
with Bils and Klenow (2000) suggesting the converse: growth leading to school-
ing. Meanwhile, by adjusting for quality differences across country, Hanushek
and Kimko (2000) find an improvement in the explanatory power of education on
growth. Also, education, fertility, and growth are intimately linked. Analyzing
these relationships would offer a better understanding of how the composition of
Rodney Ramcharan




Lemma 1: Along an equilibrium path γH(H(t), L(t)) ≥ 0 and γL(H(t), L(t)) ≥ 0 for all t.
Proof: The income stream of a high-skilled agent who earns the high-skilled wage from date s
onward is
Suppose a high-skilled individual finds it optimal to switch to the low-skilled income stream in
period t* and reenters the high-skilled sector at some later date t* +∆ t. The income profile for such
a strategy beginning on any date s is
If I chose s to be arbitrarily close to t*, then I can approximate the first two integrals by
For this income profile to be optimal, it must be the case that L(s) > H(t) and H(t*) > L(t*).
However, since the individual operated as a high-skilled in instant s but switched to the low-skilled
sector in period t*, H(s) > H(t*) and L(s) < L(t*). This implies L(s) > H(s) > H(t*) > L(t*) > L(s): a
contradiction. Therefore, because the tertiary-schooling wage differential is always positive, it
implies that H ˙ ≥ 0. A similar argument shows that γL(H(t), L(t)) ≥ 0.
To conserve notation, and without loss of generality, I assume throughout that s + u = a; therefore,
let γ(s(t)) = w(s(t)) − w(a − s(t)) denote the skill premium.
Result 1: The behavior of educational attainment along a perfect foresight equilibrium path is
described by
There is no investment in tertiary education if
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321There is no investment in secondary education if
Proof: The derivation for Result 1 depends on the following lemma. Moreover, since the argument
is identical for both skill types, generic notation s is used.
The secondary-educated agent indifferent between investing in tertiary education at time t is implic-
itly defined by the condition
Since q(θ), the fraction of the population of type less than or equal to θ, is monotonic, it can be
inverted:
For notational simplicity, I express the cost of tertiary education as c(s(t)), suppressing M(s(t)), and
I assume that cs(s(t)) < 0. The following lemma specifies some characteristics of the optimal invest-
ment date τ2 and τ1 for tertiary and secondary education, respectively.
Lemma A.1: On the optimal investment date τ the following conditions are satisfied:
There does not exist a τ′ > τ such that
Proof: The first condition is obvious. For example, suppose the optimal investment date did not sat-
isfy the inequality, then
the cost of investing in education exceeds the present discounted value of the earnings stream.
To prove the second condition, define the net value of investing on date τ2 as
This is the present discounted value of the skill premium minus the cost of investing. If date τ
is the optimal investment date, then V(τ) ≥ V (t) ∀t. If there exists τ′ that satisfies the inequality, then
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V(τ′) > V(t), a contradiction.
Now using Lemma A.1 we know that for any τ′ = τ +∆ t
while
Therefore, rearranging
and taking the limit as ∆t → 0 yields
the derivation.
Result A.2: Vertices A and C are the only asymptotically stable equilibria.
The dynamical system corresponding to this setup is
Assumption 1: Assumption 2: wc U p UU
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323The Implicit Function Theorem, the above assumptions, and the behavior of c( ) are used to depict
the level curves H = 0 and U = 0 in Figure 2. An examination of the Jacobean matrix at a candidate
equilibrium point reveals that asymptotic stability is obtained if the absolute value of the slope of U
= 0 is greater than the slope of the H = 0 level curve:
Result A.3:
Proof: Using familiar techniques from the calculus of variations, the first-order conditions imply
A similar argument holds for U ¨ = 0.
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